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COMMISSIONER V. CORPORATE COMPLEX:
AN EXPANDING ATTACK
MICHEL G. EMMANUEL*

and NORMAN H.

LIPOFF**

The normal relationship between business and an), system of
taxation is one of inter-reaction. Although the intensity and direction of this interplay of forces may vary, the Government's need for
additional revenue and the businessman's desire for greater aftertax profits inevitably meet head on. The resulting impact forges
business forms and financial policy in a manner and to a degree impossible to imagine when the sixteenth amendment was adopted.
The businessman, in his search for tax shelter, has turned more
and more to the imaginative use of the corporate entity. Encouraged
by a tax structure that favors the small corporation, the corporate
birth rate has reached the proportions of a population explosion. As
the American business executive has become more adept in the art
of taxmanship, he has broadened his use of the corporate form:
vertically in parent-subsidiary relationships, and horizontally through
the formation of sister corporations.
Although these vertical and horizontal corporate patterns have
been common in the upper echelons of industry for several decades, in
recent years many larger corporations have simplified their intercorporate structures in order to improve their fiscal and operational efficiency. Interestingly, the reverse has been true among the lower
and middle income corporations. It is in this area that the multicorporate complex has been most effectively developed into a screen
which partially deflects the force of the corporate tax.
There are many vital and valid business reasons, other than tax
savings, for segregating different commercial operations into separate corporations. It may be to limit liability, to achieve a better
financial statement for credit purposes, to insulate certain assets
against operations containing a high risk factor, to participate in a
single venture, to avoid union organization, to facilitate the purchase,
sale and financing of real and personal property, to localize and
domesticate separate branches, or to achieve other special objectives.
To most businessmen, however, there is no better business purpose
for the use of the multi-corporate form than minimizing income taxes,
for the economic equivalent of the law of the jungle dictates that each
4
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enterprise reduce its tax outgo to an absolute minimum lest it lose
its ability to compete.
Of the many tax advantages accruing to the poly-corporate arrangement, the best known is the surtax exemption ordinarily available'
to each corporation, which in effect exempts the first 25,000 of income from the twenty-two per cent corporate surtax' and makes it
taxable at a flat thirty per cent. 2 Each year this demi-tax privilege per-

mits the high bracket corporation to retain $5,500, which would otherwise be paid in taxes, for each additional corporation - an amount
equal to the return on $100,000 at five and one-half per cent. Over a
period of years, the cumulative effect of the surtax exemption can be
substantial. It is immediately evident, therefore, that a business
divided into five or six corporations may achieve a tax saving of a
magnitude that will give it a formidable advantage over a competitor
doing business as a single corporation.
In addition to the surtax exemption that each corporation may
claim, there are other tax advantages to tempt the entrepreneur into
multiplying his corporate entities. Each corporation, for example,
may claim a 5100,000 minimum accumulated earnings credit with
the resulting freedom to accumulate larger amounts of surplus without
fear that the penalty tax on unreasonable accumulations will be asserted. 3 Similarly, a company whose income is not reasonably expected to exceed $100,000 need not file a declaration of estimated income
or pay the estimated tax on such income in two installments. 4 Again,
the use of several corporations allows a certain flexibility in planning
pension and profit-sharing programs so that coverage may be limited
to a relatively small group who are employees of one or more of the
companies. 5
If it is anticipated that certain business assets or a portion of the
business itself may be disposed of in the future, advance planning as
to the best arrangement of corporate structures can be of great benefit.
By initially incorporating these assets in a separate company they may
ultimately be disposed of by selling the corporation itself or by liquidating the corporation and selling the assets. In either case, the cash
proceeds may be pocketed by the former shareholders with no more
1.

INT. REV. CODE OF

2. INT.

1954, §11 (c).

1954, §11 (b). Although the statute contemplated a reduction in the normal tax to 25%, the 30% rate has been extended and is still in
effect.
3.

REv. CODE OF

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §535 (c).

4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6016, 6154.
5. In order to qualify for exemption, the pension or profit-sharing plan must
not have the effect of discriminating in favor of officers, stockholders, supervisory
or other highly paid employees. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §401 (a) (4). This provision may be circumvented by segregating such persons in a separate corporation.
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expense than a single capital gains taxA It is much simpler to divide
the assets among several entities at the beginning than to attempt
to spin them off at a later date in the face of the "5-year rule" and
the Commissioner's unreasonable interpretation of that rule and of
what constitutes a "separate trade or business.""
Although the sale of depreciable property by a shareholder to his
"controlled" corporation will result in ordinary income, 9 there is no
statute to prevent a corporation from selling low basis depreciable
assets to a second company controlled by the same persons and thus
realizing a capital gain. The purchasing corporation would, of course,
acquire a new and higher basis equal to its cost, which it could
depreciate.1O The process could then be repeated. In this way, by
paying a twenty-five per cent capital gains tax the acquiring corporation would receive a stepped-up basis which would result in increased
depreciation deductions against a thirty per cent or a fifty-two per
cent corporate tax.
These are ways in which the multi-corporate complex may be
used by the astute businessman to place his articulated enterprise on
a higher competitive level.
While businessmen have been busy implementing the best efforts
of their tax advisors, what has been happening in the Commissioner's
camp? Are his counter efforts a mere sortie or will they develop into
a massive coup de main? How well is he armed and how effective are
his weapons?
THE COMMISSIONER'S ARSENAL
The Commissioner's expanding attack against the multi-corporate
complex generally follows one or more of the following forms:
(1) Denial of the surtax exemption.
(2) Denial of the minimum accumulated earnings credit.
(3) Disallowance of loss carryovers.
(4) Denial or disallowance of other benefits ordinarily
allowed to corporations.
(5) Attributing income to another corporation.
6. Caveat: INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341, which booby traps this entire area.
7. A corporation is treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business only when such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout
the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution and when other conditions have been met. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §355 (b) (2) (B)- (D). See Caplin,
The Five-year Business Rule for Corporate Separations, 35

TAXES

381

(1957).

8. Treas. Reg. §355-1 (c), (d); see Comm'r v. Coady, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1961), affirming 33 T.C. 771 (1960).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239.
10. The transferor should avoid accepting stock or securities of the transferee
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In each case the denial or disallowance has been predicated on the
premise that the corporation involved was formed, acquired, or availed
of for tax avoidance purposes.
The Commissioner's favorite side arms with which he seeks to
police this area are section 269, which was forged as part of the
Revenue Act of 1943,11 and section 1551,12 which was added in 1951
as a back-up weapon after the first piece misfired. 13 Other weapons,
which are perhaps smaller in caliber but equally effective in particular areas, are also being utilized as the Commissioner takes aim
at corporate tax-saving techniques.14
CORPORATE SEPARATIONS

Section 26915

Legislative History.16 Section 269 was enacted in 1943, as section
129 of the 1939 Code, to slow down the traffic in loss corporations.
World War II generated widespread acquisitions of loss corporations
to obtain loss carryovers or excess profits credits, and section 129 was
intended to stop the tax avoidance activity.
The breadth of its language made the provision seem an imposing
threat to any tax motivated acquisitions and the operative language
has changed very little since its enactment, although a presumption
has been added. 7 If any person or persons"' acquire control of a corporation, or a corporation acquires the property of another corporation, "and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made
is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit
and thus coming within the application of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §351.
11. Section 269 was formerly §129 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939.
12. Section 1551 evolved from §15 (c) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939.
13. See note 19 infra and accompanying text. See Emmanuel, Section 15(c):
New Teeth for the Reluctant Dragon?, 8 TAX L. REV. 457 (1953).
14. Section 382 provides generally that a loss carryover will be disallowed if
there has been (1) a 50% change in ownership of the corporation's outstanding
stock, and (2) a change in the trade or business of the corporation. The section
would seem inapplicable to corporate separations and initial multiple incorporation, but it should not be overlooked when corporate acquisitions are contemplated.
Sections 61 and 482 may be used to attribute claimed corporate income to another corporation. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
15. For convenience §§269 and 1551 are primarily developed in relation to
corporate separations; their effect on initial multiple incorporation is discussed
infra.
16. For an excellent discussion of §129 as viewed soon after its enactment,
see Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HARv. L. REv. 196 (1944).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §269 (c).
18. "Person" is construed by the Internal Revenue Code to include a trust,
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of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or
other allowance shall not be allowed."' 9 The legislative history of
section 269 indicates that "the principal purpose" test was deliberately
selected rather than "a principal purpose" or "a major purpose" so
that it would apply only where the most important purpose of the
entire transaction was tax avoidance. It was considered operative
"only if the evasion or avoidance purpose outranks or exceeds in im2 0

portance any other one purpose.."

Control must be acquired through the ownership of at least fifty
per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote or at least fifty per cent of the total value of shares of
all classes of stock of the corporation. In the case of the acquisition of
property by a corporation, section 269 applies only if the basis of
the property in the hands of the acquiring corporation is determined
by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation."1
Although Congress had a particular abuse in mind, the general
language gave the provision sweeping potential utility. Imposition
of the section can result in the disallowance of any "deduction, credit,
or other allowance" involved in certain acquisitions of stock or property with the "principal purpose" of income tax avoidance. With
respect to the use of the term "other allowance," the regulations under
section 269, not adopted until April of 1962, provide that the term
"refers to anything in the internal revenue laws which has the effect
of diminishing tax liability," thereby giving the section the broadest
possible scope.

22

When the 1954 Code was enacted it contained new provisions intended to provide objective standards for the allowance of net operating loss carryovers" 3 that overlapped section 269, as both were designed
to curtail the same types of transactions. As is true with much
legislation, once enacted section 269 was kept on the books 2 4 and its
broad tax avoidance language utilized to attack situations probably
not within its original intendment.
estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.

INT. REV. CODE OF

§7701 (a) (1). See also Treas. Reg. §1.269-1 (d).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §269 (a).
20. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1943); 1944 Cum.

BULL.

1954,

1017. See

Treas. Reg. §1.269-3 (a) for substantially the same statement.
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §269 (a) (2).
22. Treas. Reg. §1.269-1 (a). See also H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., IstSess.
(1943), in 1944 CuM. BULL. 938, which indicates that the provision was intended
to have the broad coverage which the Regulations give to it.
23.

INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §382.

24. The regulations under §269 specifically provide that the section may apply
where §382 does not disallow a carryover, thus preserving §269 as a secondary
attack for the Commissioner if §382 fails for some reason. Treas. Reg. §1.269-6.
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Judicial Construction. The first Tax Court decision mentioning
section 129 stifled its potential impact for a decade. In Alprosa Watch
Corporation,25 involving a taxable year prior to the effective date of
section 129, the Tax Court enunciated the dictum that the provision
would not apply to an "acquired" corporation. Subsequent Tax
Court decisions followed the dictum, thereby firmly establishing, in
the Tax Court at least, that section 129 applied only to the "acquiring"
corporation and not to the corporation "acquired" in an acquisition.26
As a result of this construction, a loss carryover could not be denied
as long as the loss corporation was the surviving corporation, since
it would be the acquired corporation. This could easily be accomplished by merging the profitable corporation into the loss corporation, referred to as a downstream merger, thus enabling the loss
carryover to be utilized. This procedure became quite popular.
Further, under the Alprosa rationale, a newly-formed corporation
could not be denied its surtax exemption or minimum accumulated
earnings credit, as it was the "acquired" and not an "acquiring" corporation. These early decisions stripped the statute of its force and
it was then generally considered impotent. The section was so easily
avoided that virtually no decisions favorable to the government were
decided under it for a number of years. In fact, its ineffectiveness was
the motivating force behind the enactment of section 15 (c) of the
27
1939 Code.
The first crack in this wall of security erected by the Tax Court
was the Fourth Circuit's decision, in 1957, in Coastal Oil Storage Co.
v. Commissioner.28 In that case an existing corporation organized a
subsidiary and transferred oil storage tanks to it, principally, in the
view of the Tax Court, to get an additional surtax exemption and
minimum excess profits credit. The Tax Court held that section
15 (c) of the 1939 Code covered the situation, but as a result of the
effective date of section 15 (c) it applied to only three of the five
months of the newly acquired corporation's first fiscal year. The
Commissioner attempted to apply section 129 but the Tax Court
held it inapplicable on the basis of its previous decisions construing
the section as not applying to the acquired corporation. The Fourth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the section 129 issue, declaring
that the provision was intended for precisely that situation, since the
Tax Court had determined that the principal purpose of the transfer
was the securing of an additional surtax exemption and minimum
25. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
26. See, e.g., T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C.
842 (1950); Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948).
27. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
28. 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 1204 (1956).
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excess profits credit. The Coastal Oil Storage case marked the Commissioner's first breakthrough under section 129 in denying benefits
to the acquired corporation in a corporate separation.
The Fifth Circuit was next to take issue with the Tax Court's po2 9
the shareholders of a
sition. In Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson,
1953, to new share31,
on
December
their
stock
sold
loss corporation
business from the
company's
the
holders who immediately changed
of bunker
and
distribution
the
sale
coal
to
production and sale of
loss to the
pre-1954
oil. The corporation was seeking to carry over its
held
against
in
Alabama
Court
District
1955.
The
taxable year ending
in
decision
Court
States
Supreme
United
on
the
based
the taxpayer
Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, which held that a business cannot
utilize a loss carryover unless it is "substantially the same business
which produced the loss"; 3 ° however, the District Court said section
129 did not apply. 31 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but based its affirmance on section 129 as well as Lisbon Shops, saying that the new shareholders acquired the corporation to obtain the tax benefits of the
earlier losses, which was the purpose forbidden in section 129 (a). This
resulted in denying the benefit of the loss carryover to the acquired
corporation.
The Ninth Circuit then held in Commissioner v. British Motor
Car Distributors,Ltd.3 2 that section 129 could apply to an "acquired"
corporation; it reversed the Tax Court, which was continuing its
stubborn adherence to the line of cases following the Alprosa dictum.
The Ninth Circuit relied upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in the
Mill Ridge case. The Tax Court was already beginning to feel the
weight of the contrary authority, as evidenced by the fact that the
British Motor Car case was reviewed by the full Tax Court with
33
five judges dissenting.
The controversy between the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals
is probably attributable to imprecise legislative draftsmanship. The
section requires the evasion to be accomplished "by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or
corporation would not otherwise enjoy .... " The pronoun "which"
could refer to either "benefit" or "deduction, credit, or other allowance." The Courts of Appeals stressed "benefit" and found that the
"acquired" corporation had secured a very real tax benefit requiring
application of the section.
In 1960, the Tax Court finally changed its position and expressly
admitted, in Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., that it erred in holding
29. 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
30. 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957).
31. 58-1 U.S.T.C. f[9489, (N.D. Ala. 1958).
32. 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960), reversing 31 T.C. 437 (1958).
33. 31 T.C. 437, 441 (1958).
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section 269 inapplicable to the corporation whose control was acquired. 34 The about-face has strengthened the Commissioner's hand
in denying the advantages of multiple corporations to income tax
oriented corporate separations. Corporations now desiring to split
up face a formidable obstacle in section 269 if there is an income tax
motivation.
There is no way to determine with certainty, in any given situation, whether the forbidden purpose under section 269 exists. The
most obvious way to negate the forbidden purpose is to have genuine
business purposes for the transaction. Business purposes that have
been successfully asserted to defeat the application of section 269 indude limiting liability,3 5 avoiding disadvantages of operating as a
foreign corporation, 36 increasing borrowing power,3 7 permitting the
handling of competitive products, 38 and securing a new source of income. 39 These and other business purposes will eliminate application of section 269 only if they are considered motivating factors of
such significance as to prevent the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax from being "the principal purpose." It is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case method with the skeptical eye of section 269 watching the decision.
The courts have the difficult task of determining whether the
claimed business purposes actually motivated the transaction, or whether they were an afterthought to substantiate action that may have
in fact been motivated by tax saving. This was stated very succinctly
by Judge Bruce of the Tax Court: "The alleged business purposes impressed us simply as a lawyer's marshaling of possible business reasons
that might conceivably have motivated the adoption of the forms
here employed but which in fact played no part whatever in the
40
utilization of the multiple corporate structure."
Section 1551
Legislative History. When the Korean War excess profits tax was
enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1950, the Commissioner began
to search for a more satisfactory method of preventing corporate taxpayers from obtaining multiple exemptions and credits by dividing
themselves into more than one corporation. The result was section
34. 34,,T.C. 400 (1960).
35.
9675
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

13kIland's Inc., 16 T.C. 182 (1951); Turner-Moore No. 22, 60-2 U.S.T.C.
(W.D. Tex. 1960).
J. E.Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951).
Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951).
Ibid.
Commodores Point Terminal Corp., supra note 26.
Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582, 598 (1960).
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15 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1951, subsequently reenacted as section
1551 of the 1954 Code.
As originally passed by the House, the statute would have limited
any group of related corporations, controlled by the same interests,
to a single surtax exemption or minimum excess profits tax credit.
This steel trap measure was rejected by the Senate Finance Committee
as "so broad in its attack on the problem that if enacted, it could
result in substantial injury to many businesses whose present corporate organization has not been motivated by tax avoidance. ' ' 41 The
bill as remoulded by the Conference Committee was enacted into law
and has been changed very little since that time. The only amendments of substance have been the elimination of the provisions that
pertained to the excess profits tax and the addition in 1954 of the
provision that denies a corporation its minimum accumulated earnings
credit if the statute is found to be applicable.
Provisions. Section 1551 provides, in effect, that if one corporation
transfers all or part of its property (other than money) to another
corporation, neither the $25,000 surtax exemption provided by section
11 (c) nor the $100,000 accumulated earnings credit provided in section
535 (c) shall be allowed the transferee if:
(1) the transferee was created for the purpose of acquiring such
property, or
(2) the transferee was not actively engaged in business at the time
of the acquisition, and
(3) after such transfer the transferor or its stockholders, or both,
are in control of the transferee during any part of the taxable year
of the transferee, unless
(a) the transferee establishes by the clear preponderance of the
evidence that the securing of either such exemption or such credit,
or both, was not a major purpose of such transfer, or
(b) the Commissioner allows such exemption or credit pursuant to the authority provided in section 1551 and section 269 (b).
When section 1551 was first enacted it was thought by many practitioners that its effect would be to further weaken section 269. In an
effort to forestall this interpretation, the Commissioner wrote into his
regulations :42
"It is not intended, however, that section 1551 be interpreted
as delimiting or abrogating any principle of law established by
41. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 1951-2 CuiN. BULL. 458, 506.
42. Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (b) (1).
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judicial decision or any existing provisions of the Code such
as sections 269 and 482, which have the effect of preventing
the avoidance or evasion of income taxes. Such principles of
law and such provisions of the Code, including section 1551
are not mutually exclusive, and in appropriate cases they may
operate together or they may operate separately."
As this area of the law developed it soon became apparent that section
1551 had, indeed, provided new teeth which began to make themselves
felt on corporate posteriors. At about the same time, the courts abandoned their elliptical approach to section 269 and made it an effective
weapon for the first time.
Nature of Transfer. Section 1551 becomes a factor in any transaction involving a transfer of property, other than cash, by one corporation to a new or previously inactive corporation. The regulations
state that the transfer falls within the scope of section 1551 even though
it qualifies as a reorganization under section 368. 43 A spin-off under
section 355 is probably also within the ambit of section 1551. The
principal forms of transfers to which the section is applicable are:
(1) sale by one corporation to a related new or previously inactive
corporation; (2) a transfer pursuant to the organization of a subsidiary
corporation under section 351; (3) a transfer that fits one of the reorganization patterns of section 368; and probably (4) a transfer
qualifying as a spin-off under section 355.
Because the statute excludes the transfer of cash from its operation, an opportunity exists to do indirectly what may not be done
directly; the transferee corporation may, to some extent, purchase assets from the transferor and pay for them with the transferred cash.
The regulations expressly state: "the transfer of cash for the purpose
of expanding the business of the transferor corporation through
the formation of a new corporation is not a transfer within the scope
of section 1551 irrespective of whether the new corporation uses the
cash to purchase from the transferor corporation stock in trade or
similar property." 44
What, then, is the "similar property" referred to by the regulations? Would it include machinery, equipment, real estate, and other
fixed assets? Probably not. A reasonable interpretation of the language used by the regulations would limit the purchase to items of
inventory, supplies, and other assets of a current nature. Even if the
similar property requirement is met, the cash transfer and the formation of the new corporation must be for the purpose of expanding
43. Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (d).
44. Ibid.
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the transferor's business. A mere split-up or division of existing functions, without expansion, would probably not bring the transaction
within the shelter afforded by the regulations' language.
The Tax Court has taken a broad view of what constitutes a
"transfer" within the meaning of section 1551. In Theatre Concessions, Inc., 45 it held that a lease was a transfer within the contemplation of the statute. In that case a Florida corporation engaged in
operating movie houses formed the taxpayer corporation and leased
to it all of the theater concession spaces and facilities. In response
to the taxpayer's argument that a lease was not a transfer, the court
pointed out: "The statute uses the words 'transfers . . . all or part of

its property' without limitations of any kind. It seems obvious to us
that the congressional intent was to include any transfer of any property."
The Tax Court underscored the rationale of the Theatre Concessions case in answering a different proposition advanced by the
taxpayer in Hiawatha Home Builders, Inc. 46 The court gave short
shrift to the argument that the term "transfer" was intended to apply
only to exchanges of property for stock and securities and did not
encompass a sale.
Another case that delineated the scope of a transfer was Airlene
Gas Co. v. United States.47 There, an existing Tennessee corporation
sold assets to its stockholders in return for personal notes and the
stockholders exchanged the assets to a new corporation in return for
its stock. The district court found that the purpose for which the
new corporation had been formed was to obtain credit from Kentucky
banks and that the purchase and exchange of property took place
early in 1951, eight months before the enactment of section 15 (c).
Accepting the transaction as bona fide, the court held that it was not
a direct transfer between the two corporations, therefore section 15 (c)
did not apply.
In view of the broad interpretation which the Tax Court has given
to the statute, it would appear that any direct transmission of property or property rights (other than cash) between two corporations,
which otherwise falls within the purview of section 1551, will be
treated as a "transfer." The treatment that indirect interchanges will
receive has not yet been fully determined. When the question arises,
the Tax Court may or may not follow the reasoning of the district
court in Airlene Gas as to what constitutes a transfer; and no court
has yet ruled on the extent to which cash received by the transferee
corporation may be used to purchase the transferor's assets.
45. 29 T.C. 754 (1958). See Rev. Rul. 57-202, 1957-1 Cm. BULL. 297.
46. 36 T.C. No. 49 (1961).
47. 58-2 U.S.T.C. 19805 (W.D. Ky. 1958).
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Status of Transferee. Congress clearly intended section 1551 to
apply either to a new corporation, whose first transaction is the receipt of property from a related corporation, or to an older corporation that has been inactive for some time prior to such transfer.48 The regulations would seem to go beyond the statute by including within the meaning of "not actively engaged in business" corporations that are engaged in winding up their affairs. 49 Although a
corporation in the last stages of liquidation may not be actively engaged in business, it is certainly true that many corporations continue
energetically in business for a lengthy period even after adopting a
plan of liquidation. From a factual viewpoint it is often difficult to
determine when a company actually commences winding up its affairs
because a surprising number of corporations are never formally
wound up and dissolved. It is suggested that the best test of business
activity is whether the company continues to receive income or to
incur expenses that are required to be reported on its income tax return.
Although section 1551 provides generally that its application will
result in denial to the transferee corporation of its surtax exemption
and accumulated earnings credit, the Commissioner is authorized to
allow all or any part of the exemption or credit to the transferee, or
to apportion them between two or more corporations, if it will not
result in tax avoidance.50
Disallowance of the exemption and credit under section 1551 is
not limited to the taxable year of the transferee corporation in which
the transfer of property occurs. The statute provides that the exemption and credit may be disallowed in a taxable year in which the transfer of property occurs or in any subsequent taxable year, if, during
any part of such year, the transferor corporation, or its stockholders,
or both, are in control of the transferee. 51

48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1551: "If any corporation transfers . . . to another corporation which was created for the purpose of acquiring such property
or which was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisition ...
49. Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (b) (3).
50. "For example, Corporation A transfers on January 1, 1955, all its property to Corporations B and C in exchange for all the stock of such corporations.
Immediately thereafter, Corporation A is dissolved and its stockholders become

the sole stockholders of Corporations B and C. Assuming that Corporations B and
C are unable to establish by the clear preponderance of the evidence that the
securing of the surtax exemption provided in section 11 (c) or the accumulated
earnings credit provided in section 535 or both, was not a major purpose of the
transfer, the Commissioner, nevertheless, has authority under sections 1551 and
269 (b) to allow one such exemption and credit and to apportion such exemption
and credit between Corporations B and C." Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (b) (2).
51. Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (c) (2).
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Control of the Transferee. In establishing whether the transferor
corporation or its stockholders, or both, are in control of the transferee corporation, the term "control" is defined in both the statute
and regulations as the ownership of stock possessing at least eighty
per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of voting
stock or at least eighty per cent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock. 5- Fair market value is used in computing the value of
shares. All classes of stock are to be considered together in determining either the voting power or value requirement. In addition to
stock owned either directly or under an option to purchase, an individual is deemed, for purposes of section 1551, to own stock held
directly or indirectly by or for his spouse or minor children. He is
also deemed to own a proportionate part of the stock owned by a
corporation, partnership, estate or trust in which he holds an interest
as a shareholder, partner or beneficiary.5 3
Purpose of the Transfer. Before the advent of section 15 (c) and
its successor, section 1551, taxpayers had assumed that a single valid
business purpose for dividing an existing corporate enterprise into two
or more corporations was sufficient to circumvent section 129 (now
section 269). After all, to trigger off section 129 tax avoidance had to
be the principal purpose of the split-up. This is not so in the case
of section 15 (c) which reduced the required dominance of the tax
avoidance motive to a major purpose. The effect of this seemingly
minor grammatical difference between the two statutes was to sweep
out the concept that a sound business purpose overrode a coexisting
desire to minimize taxes through corporate separations. Soon the
courts found themselves not only trying to determine the intent behind the transfer to a new corporation but also struggling to measure
degrees of motivation.
Fortunately for one corporation, the tax avoidance referred to in
the statute is limited to income taxes. In Contract Battery Mfg. Co.
v. Tomlinson5- the taxpayer successfully convinced a jury that the
dominant and compelling purpose for the transfer to a new corporation was to reduce manufacturers excise taxes and that income tax
savings were purely incidental.
Taxpayer corporations also prevailed in Sno-Frost, Inc.,55 and
5
Camelot Realty Co. v. United States
- in which both transferors were
forced to create separate subsidiaries to avoid losing existing franchises.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Treas. Reg. §1.1551-1 (c) (1).
Ibid.
58-2 U.S.T.C. ff9 6 55 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
31 T.C. 1058 (1959), acq., 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
60-1 U.S.T.C. 19132 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
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Similarly, in Truck Terminals, Inc.5 7 the Tax Court refused to

invoke the sanctions of sections 15 (c) and 1551 against a trucking
corporation that transferred equipment to an inactive subsidiary in
order to comply with state regulatory requirements.
Other business purposes that carried the day were: division of
risk and limitation of liability, Hiawatha Home Builders, Inc.;58 and
separation of business operations to stop internal dissension between
division managers, Cronstroms Mfg., Inc.59 On the other hand, the
taxpayers failed to sustain their burden of proof in Coastal Oil Storage
Co.,60 James Realty Co.,61 and Theatre Concessions, Inc.62
Taxpayer's Burden of Proof. It is unfortunate that section 1551
is of such a mandatory nature (save in the unlikely event that the
63
Commissioner dispenses his discretionary grace upon the taxpayer).
By its terms it requires the disallowance of the surtax exemption and
minimum accumulated earnings credit if its prerequisite conditions
are met, unless the taxpayer can establish by the "clear preponderance
of the evidence" that the securing of such exemption or credit was
not a major purpose of the questioned transfer.
The term "clear preponderance of the evidence" would appear to
be unnecessarily emphatic in a civil provision such as section 1551.
Does this language place upon a taxpayer any greater burden than
the burden of proof normally necessary to overcome the Commissioner's prima facie case? Probably not, since the statute creates no
additional presumption in favor of the Commissioner's determination.
The taxpayer's burden is neither greater nor less than it has always
been in a civil suit - the burden of going forward with the evidence
and proving the Commissioner's determination wrong by the greater
weight of the evidence.
INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF MULTIPLE CORPORATIONS
It had been generally assumed that advance planning at the organizational stage would have fruitful results for the use of multiple
corporations. Section 1551 seems inapplicable to initial organization
of multiple corporations since, by its terms, it takes hold only if a
corporation transfers property to another corporation. It was originally
57. 33 T.C. 876 (1960), acq., 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 7.
58. 36 T.C. No. 49 (1961).
59. 36 T.C. No. 50 (1961).
60. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
61. James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959), aff'd,
280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
62. 29 T.C. 754 (1958).
63. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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thought that section 269 would not apply to multi-incorporation because of the Alprosa dictum and it became a regular practice in some
industries, such as the home construction business, to incorporate
separately every function or portion of a venture from the outset.
The developing line of cases applying section 269 to acquired
corporations should have made taxpayers uneasy in their search for
tax saving through initial multiple incorporation. The James Realty
Co. v. United States case, decided in 1960, justified any fears that taxpayers, or their advisors, had. 64 In that case nine corporations were
formed to conduct real estate development and construction. The
Eighth Circuit held that there was no business purpose for the multiple corporations and that they were formed solely for tax avoidance.
Relying on section 129 it denied the surtax exemption and excess
profits tax credit. The court said "acquisition of control," as used
in the statute, includes acquiring stock of a newly organized corporation. The Mill Ridge, Coastal Oil, and British Motor Car cases were
followed for the proposition that the "acquired" corporation could be
denied the tax benefits of multiple corporations.
The Commissioner attempted to apply section 15 (c) in the James
Realty case and the District Court agreed that it applied as well as
section 129.65 The Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide
whether section 15 (c) applied, 66 and its reluctance is well founded
since the language of section 15 (c), and section 1551 of the 1954 Code,
clearly provides that it applies only to transfers by a corporation.
This seemingly precludes its use in the initial organization of multiple corporations, but the Commissioner has continued the attempt to
apply section 1551 in such situations.67 It is possible, however, that
section 1551 could be construed to apply to a corporation formed with
assets received by the shareholders of an existing corporation on a
distribution or purchase, based upon the theory that the transaction
was in substance a transfer by the existing corporation to the new
corporation.66
The Commissioner has attempted to use other weapons in attacking
multiple corporations organized as such from the outset. If the abuse
is blatant enough, the multiple corporations may be disregarded as
sham. Through the use of section 61, the income of the multiple
corporations may be attributed to one corporation, thus resulting
64.

280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); see Treas. Reg. §1.269-3 (b) (2).

65. James Realty Co. v. United States, supra note 61.
66. James Realty Co. v. United States, supra note 64, at 403.
67. See Concord Supply Corp., 37 T.C. No. 89 (1962), in which the Tax Court
held for the Government based on §269 and found it unnecessary to decide the
§1551 point. See also Henry S. Alper, 21 T.C.M. 185 (1962).

68. See Airlene Gas Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9805 (W.D. Ky. 1958),
which recognizes the possibility.
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in the loss of benefits otherwise obtainable. In Aldon Homes, Inc.69
the shareholders had formed sixteen corporations to own lots purchased from the dominant corporation. The corporations owning the
lots did not handle the construction or the sale of houses, which was
carried out by other corporations. The Tax Court agreed with the
Commissioner that the income of the corporations should be attributed
to the dominant corporation that had originally purchased the land
and which undertook the overall planning. The court said the
sixteen corporations "did not carry on the business activities which
resulted in the profits ... nor any substantial business activities, and
consequently did not earn the income in question; that, though legal
entities in form, for purposes of taxation, they were unreal or shams
and are to be disregarded."70
The Commissioner has also attempted to utilize section 482 in
attacking multiple incorporation. That provision, formerly section
45 of the 1939 Code, allows the Commissioner to allocate income,
deductions, credits or allowances among organizations controlled by
the same interests in order to clearly reflect the income of any of
the organizations. The Commissioner has asserted section 482 in
attempting to tax the income of multiple corporations to one of the
corporations when income has been arbitrarily divided, and has met
with some success, 7 1 although the courts have found firmer ground
in relying on the general gross income definition of section 61 when
the two sections are argued in conjunction.7 2 Although the provision
has not as yet been particularly effective in denying multiple corporation advantage, it is of potential use in the case of a flagrant abuse
3
of multiple corporations.7
CONCLUSION

The courts have now clearly established that the Commissioner can
use section 269 concurrently with section 1551 in the case of corporate
separations. If section 1551 is applied it gives the taxpayer a heavier
burden because it requires that the securing of the surtax exemption
or accumulated earnings credit be only one of the major purposes,
whereas under section 269 tax avoidance must be the principal purpose.
69.

Aldon Homes, Inc., 35 T.C. 582 (1960).

70. Id. at 597.
71. E.g., Advance Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. 84 (1949),
afj'd, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1952); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 182
F. Supp. 829 (D. Neb. 1960).
72. See Shaw Construction Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961), involving 88 multiple corporations which the Commissioner successfully attacked.
73. See, e.g., Shaw Construction Co., supra note 72.
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In the initial organization of multiple corporations, section 269
is the strongest weapon the Commissioner possesses. In addition,
there has been sufficient activity to justify keeping a watchful eye on
section 61, the gross income definition provision, and section 482,
which provides for allocation to reflect income clearly. These possible avenues of attack by the Commissioner should cause taxpayers
and their advisors to tread lightly in planning multiple corporate
status.
In making business judgments the costs of a proposed course of
action must be weighed against the stakes involved and the chances
of not succeeding. Formation of multiple corporations entails the
expense of incorporation, capital stock taxes and other fees, and
whatever additional expense the separate bookkeeping may cost each
corporation. Of course, there must be such a sufficient legitimate
basis for multiple corporations that there could be no question of
tax fraud involved. The principal risk then assumed is that the
corporations may not get the tax benefits of multiple corporations
thus placing them in the same tax position as if formed as a single
corporation except for interest on tax deficiencies and expenses in
resolving the question. The businessman is thus faced with the decision whether the extra cost is warranted to gain the tax and other
advantages of multiple entities.
A businessman should not be condemned for considering taxes as
well as the other factors which may influence him to form multiple
corporations. No intelligent business decision can be made without
full evaluation of the tax consequences. It is an unfortunate aspect
of the tax avoidance doctrine that requires executives to pretend to
ignore a factor no enlightened businessman could possibly overlook
in making decisions.
It is submitted that sections 269 and 1551 take the wrong approach
to the problem. It is unreasonable to place a heavy burden upon the
business community to subordinate tax considerations. If tax motives
are coupled with non-tax motives the transaction should be given
efficacy for tax purposes. The burden upon the taxpayer to negate
a motive to minimize income taxes should be removed. If a transaction has a business purpose and is not a sham it should not be
subject to attack based on the tax advantages which may result. Perhaps a test preferable to that currently employed is whether the transaction would have been entered into but for the tax advantages. This
would result in the administration of tax laws that conform more
closely to business realities.
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